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This paper uses Data Envelopment Analysis to measure scale and technical efficiencies of
925 farms in rural Colombia and a Tobit model to identify the effects of land market
characteristics on efficiency. Findings indicate that although larger farms are more scale
efficient, they are not more technical efficient than small farms. Participation in land
markets increases technical efficiency, indicating a positive potential role for market-based
land reform.  Further results show that intensity of violence in rural areas results in increased
scale efficiency, allegedly through consolidation of land ownership. 
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MARKET-BASED LAND REFORM AND FARM EFFICIENCY IN COLOMBIA:
A DEA APPROACH
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Land is the main factor of production in rural areas of the developing world. Social
status and power relations are mostly determined by the structure of landholdings, and the
inegalitarian distribution of land is often the origin of social unrest when large portions of
the rural population struggle for access to land.
Traditionally, land reforms were based on controlled redistribution of expropriated or
frontier lands with the aim of reducing ownership concentration, but without much regard to
production efficiency. Since the 1990s, new land reform programs in many developing
countries are increasingly looking towards land markets as the mean of redistributing land
while raising productive efficiency in part due to pressure from external donors such as the
World Bank. 
Empirical studies have found an inverse relationship between farm size and land
productivity in developing countries, suggesting that land markets should lead to a relatively
egalitarian structure as land is transferred from large to small and more efficient farmers
(Binswanger et al., 1993; van Zyl, et al., 1995; Bardhan, 1973; Barnum and Squire, 1978;
Carter, 1984). However, more often than not, land sales go in the opposite direction as land
is transferred from distressed small farmers to large landlords and moneylenders. Although
there may exist some real economies of scale, they are mostly temporary and the result of
policies that favor larger farmers over small ones (van Zyl, et al., 1995). The ongoing
concentration of land ownership can only mean that large farms are relatively more efficient3
than small ones or, more likely, that concentration is due to distortions in land and related
factor markets. 
Many of the market distortions are due to government intervention in the output
market that drives up the price of land and undermines both efficiency and equity.
Imperfections in other factor markets may also hamper efficiency and equity. For example,
credit constraints or lack of insurance mechanisms reduce the ability of small farmers to buy
additional land, although they may be more efficient, and increase their dependency of land
sales in times of crisis (Bardham and Udry, 1999; Binswanger, et al., 1995). 
At present, there is a controversy between market and non-market mechanisms to
influence land redistribution. In the presence of market distortions, studies that embrace
non-market mechanisms point out that the activation of land sales is likely to cause
increased land concentration at the expense of poorer farmers while hampering efficiency
(Baland et al, 2002; Zimmerman and Carter, 1997; Collier, 1983). Neoliberal land reform
policies that are based on market allocation downplay market failures and rely on the
capacity of land markets, particularly rental markets, to lead to efficiency. Studies that
embrace market mechanisms point out that rental markets are less affected by credit
constraints and have lower transaction costs than sales markets, thus further contributing to
both efficiency and equity measures (Deininger 2001, Kingsmill and Rogg, 2000; Carter and
Olinto, 1996). However, as pointed out by Balland et al (2002), the impact of land sales on
efficiency and land distribution is an empirical matter and cannot be determined a priori. 
Colombia provides an interesting and useful case study to analyze the impact of
market-based land reforms. The country has a long history of land reform policies. Since the
1930s, there have been numerous attempts to reduce the highly unequal distribution of land4
in order to reduce rural poverty and increase agricultural productivity through redistributive
land reforms. A World Bank mission identified maldistribution of productive resources,
especially land, as one of the root causes of economic stagnation in the 1950s. Despite
massive efforts, Colombia still presents a highly dualistic distribution of land, with a large
number of small farms and a small number of very large farms that account for a large share
of the total productive land. The complexity of rural markets and prevalence of violence
have to be considered in the design of policies. Violence and insecurity in Colombia are
important factors that cannot be ignored when analyzing rural land markets as they are in
part rooted in the unequal and exclusionary agrarian system.
This paper uses Data Envelopment Analysis to measure the efficiency of a sample of
farms in Colombia and a Tobit model to explain the sources of efficiency. The results shed
light on the farm size-efficiency argument and the likelihood of success of alleged efficiency
and equity effects of market-based land reforms. The paper is structured as follows. Section
2 describes the functioning of land markets in Colombia and the recent history of the
agrarian reform. Section 3 describes the survey methodology and other sources of data used
for the analysis. Section 3 presents the methodological approach used in our study to
calculate the efficiency indexes and to analyze the sources of inefficiency. In section 4 we
provided the summary and conclusions of the efficiency analysis.
2.  BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM
Agricultural development in Colombia has involved substantial misallocation of
resources. Land reform was concentrated on the colonization and titling of frontier lands
rather than on the redistribution of land toward small farmers. These policies did not reduce5
poverty in the rural areas and limited the access of poor farmers to good land that was
occupied by low-intensity livestock ranching. Heath and Binswagner (1996) point out that
there is a “large-farmer bias” in Colombia, where livestock and grain crops have been the
most protected sectors, neither of which is labor intensive, favoring the creation of large
states. Also, credit policies tended to discriminate against small farmers that had very
limited access to formal sources of credit. This situation has increased the propensity of
violence in rural areas creating insecurity and reducing the incentive to invest. Land
investment during the 1970s was concentrated on activities that were relatively low
intensive in the use of labor, like livestock and grain crops. 
Most authors conclude that land ownership is a major element explaining the
country’s violent history (Kay, 2001; Kirchoff and Ibañez, 2001; Grusczynski and Jaramillo,
2002). Conflict over land is one of the main causes of rural population displacement in
Colombia now reaching over 1.2 million people displaced. Poor rural populations are the
most affected by this situation. They are caught in the middle of four key political actors in
the conflict: the State, the paramilitary, the guerrillas, and the drug mafia. Therefore, the
performance of the new land reform is likely to be importantly shaped by the geography and
severity of violence. 
Land ownership patterns in Colombia have evolved over time. During the 1984–97
period there was a clear tendency of increasing concentration of landownership. As
illustrated in Table 1, this period was characterized by a marked concentration of land in the
hands of large farms, largely at the cost of medium-sized farms. While the number of
“small” farm units (comprising less than two Unidades Agrícolas Familiares [UAFs]
1)
increased slightly, from 89.9 percent to 91.1 percent of all farms, the share of area cultivated6
by these shows a slight decrease, from 23.1 percent in 1984 to 21.4 percent in 1997. A more
significant reduction in area, from 30.5 percent to 24.8 percent with almost constant share in
the farm units, is observed for medium-sized farms. This implies that large farms, even
though their number slightly decreased, increased their share of area from 46.3 percent to
53.8 percent over the period. The lower panel of Table 1 illustrates that conclusions are even
more pronounced if physical area is taken as the basis for the assessment.
One important factor perpetuating this dual property system is the segmentation of
land markets. A 1994 study by the Food Agricultural Organization (FAO), reveals that land
markets in Colombia are a reflection of the structure of landownership. Land markets are
quite active but are not able to transfer land from large producers to small or landless
farmers. There are two types of market segmentation. The first type is economic. Sales of
large and smallholdings are done in separate markets. Normally there is not connection
between these two markets, with the exception of areas affected by violence, where small
farmers migrate and had to sell their land, favoring the concentration of land. The second
type of segmentation is social. Land is many times transferred to neighbors, family, or other
related people in order to protect the community. In both cases buyers and sellers have the
same socioeconomic level. Rental markets are also segmented, but to a lesser degree than
sales markets. 
3.  METHODOLOGY 
To determine the relative impact that land markets and institutional distribution of
land have on productive efficiency a two-step procedure will be used. First, farm technical
efficiency is computed using linear programming techniques, which is then used as the7
dependent variable in a second stage regression, where the explanatory variables measure
land markets characteristics relevant to the farmers. 
In the first stage a non-parametric frontier analysis method, also known as Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA), is used to estimate the household level of agricultural
efficiency. One important advantage of DEA model is that it does not require specifying an
explicit functional form for technology (Desli, 1999; Bauer, 1990). The DEA imposes the
simple restriction that all farms lie on or below the efficient frontier (Papadas and Dahl,
1991; Thiele and Brodersen, 1999; Manthijs and Swinnen, 2001). 
The DEA methodology uses linear programming techniques to measure efficiency as
the distance of each farm from a non-parametric production frontier (Gilligan, 1998). Each
observation is characterized by an input vector X=(x1, x2, ..., xm) and an output vector Y=(y1,
y2, ...,ys) Feasible input-output combinations are represented by the production possibility
set, T, given by: 
() {} , 0 can be produced from X TX Y Y =≥
Farrell (1957) defined technical efficiency via an isoquant that contains the efficient
points using the minimum required inputs to produce a unit level of output. For a given
input-output vector, the efficiency frontier is expressed in terms of minimizing the input
requirements per unit of output. In figure 1 the frontier isoquant is derived by the linear
combination of the efficient farms (B and C). Total technical efficiency of farm A is
measured by the ratio EA
T= OD/OA, where OD represents the lowest input combination
which farm A could use to produce a unit of output.8
Consider a sample of n farms (k=1,...,n), producing s outputs (i=1,...,s) with m inputs
(j=1,...,m). Based on Farrell’s ideas, Charnes, Cooper, and Rodhes (1978) proposed the
following linear programming model to measure technical efficiency under the assumption
of constant returns to scale (CRS):
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where  ￿k is the Farell’s measure of total efficiency (Ek
T) of the k
th farm and satisfies
01 k λ ≤≤ . When ￿k = 1, the farm is operating on the frontier. If ￿k < 1 the farm does not
operate on the frontier and is inefficient. The vector ￿(1 x n) contains weights attached to each
farm. The vectors X
k and Y
k denote inputs and outputs of the k
th farm. Similarly, Y and X are
the matrices of all outputs and inputs. The constraints in (1) indicate that the weighted
combination of other farms must produce at least as much of each output, as does the k
th
farm (first constraint), while not using any more of any input than does farm k (second
constraint).
Banker et al. (1984) modified the above model to allow for variable returns to scale








= ∑ . Introducing this constraint has the effect of9
pulling the frontier in to envelop the observations more closely. Total efficiency of the farms
can be decomposed into two effects, a pure technical effect (E
P), and a scale effect (E
S)
which depends on whether farms are appropriately sized or not (Piesse, et al., 1996). The
pure technical effect (E
P) is obtained by solving the optimization problem with the new
constraint. The measure of scale efficiency (E
S) can be derived by taking the ratio of the
constant returns to the variable returns efficiency index, E
S = E
T/E
P. Figure 2 illustrates
intuitively the efficiency measures. Constant returns to scale technology is denoted by the
linear production curve OP. Farms A, D, and E, are overall technically inefficient because
they are below the CRS frontier. Allowing for VRS the frontier is concave and farms A and
D become pure technically efficient (EA
P = ED
P= 1). The effect that remains is the scale
effect. Farm A is scale inefficient by EA
S = OX
2/OX because it is too small. Similarly, farm
D is pure technically efficient but scale inefficient because it is too large. Farm E is
technically inefficient by EE
P = OX
3/OX








In the second stage, parametric techniques are used to regress the efficiency indexes
on a set of land market characteristics pertinent to each farmer generating the following
model:
k k k e W E + =β (2)
where Ek = {}
TPS E, E, E , Wk is a vector of explanatory variables, β is the parameter to be
estimated, and ek is the error term. The set of explanatory variables includes variables such
as the amount of operated land, a dummy representing whether or not the household is a10
land reform beneficiary, a dummy indicating participation in the rental markets, and an
index indicating the level of conflict in the area where the farm is located. 
4.  DATA SOURCES 
The data used are two main sources. One is a survey undertaken by the
Departamento Nacional de Plantación (DNP) in collaboration with the Instituto
Interamericano de Cooperación para la Agricultura (IICA) and the World Bank. The data
were collected in 1999 and contain information on the period comprised between July 1998
and June 1999. 
The survey consists of two separate modules: Module 1 was implemented at the
Agricultural Productive Unit (UPA)
2. Information in this module is related to all agricultural
and livestock activities in which the UPA is involved, as well as information regarding
rental or sales activity, land quality, credit, permanent and temporary labor, farm assets, and
technical assistance. Thus, it contains agricultural information. Module 2 was implemented
at the agricultural producer’s household level and contains non-agricultural information.
This module collected information on basic household characteristics (composition,
education, income, expenses, etc.), off-farm labor, migration, non-farm assets, and non-farm
family business. 
The sample includes 55 municipalities that were stratified into 11 zones
3 of similar
agro-ecological characteristics and systems of production. The data were collected for about
1600 UPAs using a 3-stage stratified random procedure for the areas
4. After elimination of
incomplete observations the sample is reduced to 925 production units. 11
The second source is data on displaced people used to assess the impact of violence
on farm efficiency. The available literature does not offer a universally accepted measure of
violence. Kirchhoff and Ibañez (2001) argue that violence and the perception of insecurity
are the main reasons motivating displacement in Colombia. Thus, the number of displaced
people can be considered a good indicator of the level of conflict in the expulsory location.
This data is provided by the International Committee of the Red Cross and contains detailed
information on the number of displaced population that can easily match the levels of
aggregation in the survey. 
The analysis is conducted at the regional level with the area being divided into
eleven agricultural regions. This is motivated by the agro-climatic characteristics that remain
constant within the region but vary across regions. In this context one can assume that the
production technology is constant for farmers in the same agro-climatic zone but potentially
different across zones. 
Data used in the non-parametric efficiency analysis of Colombian farms include two
categories of outputs: (1) crops; and (2) livestock. Inputs are classified into six broad
categories: (1) hired labor (2) family labor; (3) crop inputs (seeds, fertilizers, and other
chemicals); (4) animal inputs (purchased feed, breeding and other expenses); (5) machinery;
and (6) land. The outputs and inputs included in the analysis are valued at their opportunity
costs. 12
5.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
5.1 DEA Results
This section presents the indexes of pure, scale and total efficiencies calculated for
each agro-climatic region. Thus, a benchmark frontier is establish in each region for the
technically efficient farms in order to measure the inefficiency of the other farms compared
to those lying on the frontier. 
Table 2 presents the DEA results 11 agro-climatic zones analyzed. The mean index
of total efficiency with respect to best practice farms ranges form 42% in Veriente Sur to
68% in Valle del Cesar. Since in this analysis the size effect is of particular interest, greater
attention is paid to the scale efficiency effects. In Data Envelopment Analysis extreme
values and data variance play a more important role than in parametric analysis. Particularly,
scale efficiency is sensitive to the variation in farm size. 
The region of Magdalena Alto and Veriente Sur present the lowest index for scale
efficiency. For Magdalena Alto, the average land area for the farms on the efficiency
frontier is approximately 148 ha, but the average farm size for the entire region is only 64ha.
This clearly indicates that a source of scale inefficiency in Magdalena Alto is the fact that
farms are too small. Small farmers are scale inefficient relative to the larger units. Thus,
increasing the size of the smallest farms will help to foster overall efficiency. 
In comparison, Vertiente Nororiental and Piedemonte Llanero have larger values of
scale efficiency indexes, in part due to the lower variance in farm size within these two
regions compare to Magdalena Alto. For example the benchmark frontier for Vertiente
Nororiental is composed of small farms whose size ranges from 1 to 51 ha.13
5.2 Tobit Results 
The Tobit results for all 925 farms in the sample are presented in Table 3.  The
empirical results indicate that farmers participating in land markets attain a higher level of
scale efficiency. By renting or buying farmland, this group is better able to adjust the size of
their operation closer to the optimal size.  However, in terms of pure efficiency, this group is
not different than non-participants. Overall, land renters are more technically efficient than
other groups, although overall the technical efficiency of those buying land, in the end, does
not appear to be different than the overall technical efficiency of those who do not buy land. 
The Tobit results also point out that recent land reform beneficiaries were less scale
and technically efficient. Thus, administrated land reform through INCORA was shown to
be less efficient than market-driven land allocation.  One stated goal of INCORA is to
benefit small farmers. However, land distributed this way may not be enough for these
farmers to attain full-scale efficiency. 
On the other hand, controlling for the forms of land acquisition (market or land
reform), larger farms are more scale efficient but less technically efficient. In fact, the results
show that the technical benefits of their size are outweighed by their technical inefficiency.
The implications for implementing land reform with a large population of small farmers is
that these farmers need to increase their size to increase their scale efficiency. This need can
complement a market-based land reform to increase overall efficiency.
Further results show that the intensity of violence at the municipal level, as measured
by the percentage of the population displaced, results in scale efficiency. As small farmers14
are more likely to be displaced, violence induces consolidation of land ownership resulting
in scale efficiency. However, other types of efficiency are not affected by violence.  
6.  CONCLUDING REMARKS
A main conclusion from the Colombia experience is that a market-based land reform
system is likely to be more technically efficient than an administrative one. Much of the
efficiency advantage, however, is driven by scale efficiency and not due to pure technical
efficiency. Although larger farms are more scale efficient, smaller farms are more
technically efficient. Given the large farm population comprised by small farmers in
Colombia, a worthwhile development strategy is to strengthen land markets, particularly
rental markets, to overcome barriers that hamper the functioning of land markets.  
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Table 1. Structure of landownership and land use in Colombia, between 1984 and 1997
By Productive Capacity
Area % of farms
1984 1997 1984 1997
Small (0–2 UAF) 23.15 21.40 89.92 91.11
Medium (2–10 UAF) 30.50 24.80 8.68 7.81
Large (> 10 UAF) 46.35 53.80 1.40 1.08
By Physical Extension
Area % of farms
1984 1997 1984 1997
< 100 hectares 40.00 34.50 96.90 97.40
100–500 hectares 27.50 20.50 2.70 2.30
>500 hectares 32.50 45.00 0.40 0.30
Sources: Top panel from Machado (1999); bottom panel from Mondragon (1999).
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Table 2. Total, Pure and Scale Efficiency Indexes 








   
             
  mean  0.56 0.75 0.69  
 
Valle del Sinú and San
Jorge median 0.46 0.98 0.90  
  S. Deviation 0.39 0.30 0.37  
  # of efficient firms   26.00 38.00 28.00  
  % of efficient firms 0.33 0.48 0.35  
       
  Valles del Bajo Magdalena mean  0.54 0.67 0.72  
  median 0.56 0.83 0.89  
  S. Deviation 0.39 0.36 0.34  
  # of efficient firms   26.00 41.00 28.00  
  % of efficient firms 0.28 0.44 0.30  
       
  mean  0.68 0.80 0.81  
 
Valles del Cesar and
Ranchería  median 0.82 1.00 0.98  
  S. Deviation 0.35 0.29 0.28  
  # of efficient firms   33.00 44.00 36.00  
  % of efficient firms 0.41 0.55 0.45  
       
  Magdalena Medio mean  0.61 0.77 0.74  
  median 0.81 1.00 0.98  
  S. Deviation 0.41 0.33 0.34  
  # of efficient firms   30.00 41.00 32.00  
  % of efficient firms 0.43 0.59 0.46  
     
  Magdalena Alto mean  0.45 0.62 0.65  
  median 0.39 0.62 0.78  
  S. Deviation 0.37 0.35 0.34  
  # of efficient firms   21.00 36.00 23.00  
  % of efficient firms 0.19 0.32 0.21  
       
  Vertiente Nororiental mean  0.65 0.83 0.76  
  median 0.92 1.00 0.99  
  S. Deviation 0.39 0.30 0.32  
  # of efficient firms   32.00 45.00 32.00  
  % of efficient firms 0.47 0.66 0.47  
             
           
Altiplanos mean  0.59 0.78 0.74  
median 0.59 0.98 0.82  
S. Deviation 0.35 0.30 0.29  
# of efficient firms   23.00 37.00 26.00  
% of efficient firms 0.31 0.49 0.35  
     
Vertiente Central  mean  0.58 0.72 0.74  
median 0.59 0.88 0.91  
S. Deviation 0.39 0.32 0.31  
# of efficient firms   33.00 39.00 34.00  
% of efficient firms 0.36 0.42 0.37  22
Table 2. Total, Pure and Scale Efficiency Indexes (Cont.)
     
Vertiente Sur mean  0.42 0.60 0.68  
median 0.28 0.56 0.75  
S. Deviation 0.35 0.33 0.30  
# of efficient firms   23.00 40.00 27.00  
% of efficient firms 0.17 0.29 0.20  
     
Vertiente Noroccidental mean  0.56 0.74 0.73  
median 0.46 0.94 0.82  
S. Deviation 0.37 0.30 0.31  
# of efficient firms   20.00 30.00 20.00  
% of efficient firms 0.32 0.48 0.32  
     
Piedemonte Llanero mean  0.58 0.66 0.83  
median 0.55 0.88 0.97  
S. Deviation 0.39 0.37 0.24  
# of efficient firms   35.00 42.00 36.00  
% of efficient firms 0.39 0.47 0.40  
          23
Table 3. Tobit Estimates 
Total Efficiency Pure Efficiency Scale Efficiency
% Displaced population in a municipality 0.104 0.082 0.151**
(1.18) (0.90) (2.06)
Land reform beneficiaries dummy 0.008 -0.100 0.056
(0.11) (1.29) (0.89)
Land reform beneficiaries in last 5 years -0.227* -0.202 -0.257**
(1.68) (1.46) (2.29)
Area rented in 0.007** 0.004 0.015***
(2.01) (1.15) (2.87)
Area rented out -0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.89) (0.34) (1.53)
Bought land during last 5 years 0.055 0.010 0.088*
(0.99) (0.17) (1.93)
Sold  land during last 5 years -0.020 -0.065 0.039
(0.24) (0.75) (0.56)
Land (log) -0.007 -0.039*** 0.021**
(0.66) (3.67) (2.51)
Valles del Bajo Magdalena -0.062 -0.111 -0.025
(0.73) (1.24) (0.36)
Valles del Cesar and Ranchería 0.184** 0.173* 0.124*
(2.06) (1.83) (1.68)
Magdalena Medio 0.074 0.063 0.048
(0.80) (0.64) (0.62)
Magdalena Alto -0.171** -0.221*** -0.118*
(2.16) (2.65) (1.78)
Vertiente Nororiental 0.175* 0.206** 0.119
(1.90) (2.06) (1.57)
Altiplanos 0.040 0.026 0.091
(0.45) (0.27) (1.21)
Vertiente Central 0.059 -0.066 0.096
(0.69) (0.75) (1.37)
Vertiente Sur -0.212*** -0.291*** -0.047
(2.72) (3.56) (0.74)
Vertiente Noroccidental -0.029 -0.086 0.015
(0.30) (0.85) (0.19)
Piedemonte Llanero 0.040 -0.052 0.085
(0.44) (0.54) (1.11)
Constant 0.625*** 1.005*** 0.672***
(9.07) (13.69) (11.78)
Observations 925 925 925
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%24
Footnotes
                                                
1 The UAF is the area of land which, for given agroecological conditions, can generate income for a family.
Because the UAF is defined at the level of municipalities and natural regions within these, it provides a better
way of accounting for the potentially vast differences in land quality that are difficult to integrate into the
analysis if only physical farm size is considered.
2 Unidad de Producción Agraria. It is defined as the economic unit involved in agricultural and livestock
production under a unique management. The UPA can have more than one plot as long the plots share the
same “production means”, i.e. same labor force, machinery and buildings, used for the purpose of agricultural
production. Information is collected at the UPA level and at the plot level (whenever this is possible).
3 These 11 regions are: (1) Valle del Sinú and San Jorge; (2) Valles del Bajo Magdalena; (3) Valles del Cesar
and Ranchería; (4) Magdalena Medio; (5) Magdalena Alto; (6) Vertiente Nororiental; (7) Altiplanos; (8)
Vertiente Central; (9) Vertiente Sur; (10) Vertiente Noroccidental; (11) Piedemonte Llanero.
4 In the first stage 55 municipalities are selected as primary sampling unit (PSU) from a universe of 604
municipalities. The secondary sampling units (SSU) are 110 (2 for each PSU selected) and are constructed
using the number of houses as a “proxy” for the number UPAs on the sampling unit. In the third stage 110
terciary sampling units, (UTM) or segments, are selected, one for each SSU. The segments are groups of UPAs
(on average 16 UPAs per segment); all households and UPAs on the selected segments were interviewed.